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Abstract Discussions about the evolution of human social cognition usually 
portray the social environment of early hominins as highly hierarchical and 
dominant. In this evolutionary narrative, our propensity for violence was 
overcome in our lineage by a key increase of our intellectual capacities. 
However, I will argue in this paper that we are at least equally justified in 
believing that our early hominin ancestors were less aggressive and 
hierarchical than what is claimed by those models. This view is consistent 
with the available comparative and paleoanthropological evidence. I will show 
that this alternative model not only does not support long-held views of human 
origins but also has important consequences for debates about the evolution of 
our capacity for normative guidance. 
Keywords aggression, dominance, early hominins, normative guidance, 
Pan/Homo LCA 
 
Reconstructions of the last common ancestor of chimpanzees (P. troglodytes), bonobos (P. 
paniscus) and humans (H. sapiens) are important in understanding human origins. These 
discussions usually portray the Pan/Homo last common ancestor (Pan/Homo LCA hereafter) 
as a chimpanzee-like hominid (Dart, 1953; Lee & DeVore, 1969; Wrangham & Peterson, 
1996; for a historical reconstruction of this debate, see also Pickering, 2013). This has long 
been the prevailing view in the philosophical and biological literature, and normative and 
moral cognition is no exception. Recent accounts of the evolution of the human capacity for 
normative guidance such as Kitcher (2011) rely on this approach. I will argue that since the 
demonic male view and evolutionary models of normative thinking based on it no longer 
stand up, we need an alternative explanation of this capacity that relies on a different view of 
human origins. The goal of this paper is to articulate such a view. 
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I will argue in this paper that we are as justified in using an alternative model of early 
hominins, and perhaps even the Pan/Homo LCA, as we are in believing that early ancestors 
were chimpanzee-like. According to this model, early hominins were much more socially 
tolerant and less aggressive than usually assumed. I ground this claim in both the comparative 
evidence and the paleoanthropological record. As a result, I will argue that this model does 
not fit well with views such as the demonic male view (Wrangham & Peterson, 1996) or the 
killer ape hypothesis (Dart, 1953).
1
 More important, I will show here that such a model has 
important consequences for philosophical debates about the origin of our capacity for 
normative guidance (Kitcher, 1998, 2006, 2011). 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 1, I will explain the philosophical 
motivations behind this debate. In section 2, I will discuss the problem of reconstructing the 
social behavior of our early hominin ancestors. In section 3, I shall explain the specific model 
of these ancestors I want to propose. In section 4 and 5, I will provide evidence in favor of 
this model. Finally, in section 6, I will draw out the philosophical moral of this discussion for 
our understanding of our capacity for normative guidance. 
  
1. Philosophical motivation 
 
Philosophers have argued that the deep history of why we became moral agents is relevant to 
normative philosophy. For one way to understand human nature is to understand its 
genealogy. One primary example is the role that various origin stories of morality have 
played in moral philosophy (Hobbes, 1668/1994; Nietzsche, 1887/1967; Rousseau, 
1755/1992; see also Korsgaard, 2010). Another example is the way in which the evolutionary 
genealogy of our moral faculties have become a way to vindicate (Kitcher, 2006, 2011) or 
debunk morality (Joyce, 2006; Ruse, 1998; Ruse & Wilson, 1986). As a result, genealogical 
projects in philosophy become highly sensitive to different assumptions about our hominin 
baseline. Depending on these assumptions, for instance, some evolutionary narratives will 
become more vindicatory than others. 
                                                 
1
 Something similar can be said about the man-the-hunter hypothesis (Lee & DeVore, 1969). For hunting and 
aggression are usually considered to be a package deal. However, the model of the Pan/Homo LCA I will 
propose in this paper does not rule out the idea that hunting played an important role in the evolution of 
normative guidance. 
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According to the demonic male hypothesis (Wrangham & Peterson, 1996) and the 
killer ape hypothesis (Dart, 1953), we evolved from a chimpanzee-like hominin whose basic 
social nature was characterized by hostile intergroup relations. Human and chimpanzee males 
share a capacity for violence because our common ancestor also possessed a genetic 
predisposition for such capacity. On this view, this predisposition not only is an important 
aspect of human psychology but also it substantially contributed to the evolution of our 
lineage by constraining the path and setting the pace of human social-cognitive adaptations. 
Human ancestors were distinctively aggressive, and this trait was preserved thanks to the role 
of war and interpersonal aggression in the evolution of our lineage. On this picture, emotional 
reactivity led to social groups controlled by aggressive alpha males, but the increased 
cognitive demands of cooperative hunting and tool-making helped us to control our 
aggressive tendencies. Put another way, from a cognitive point of view, human evolution can 
be seen as the story of the emergence of different forms of top-down control over our more 
disruptive and less reliable emotional nature.
2
 Humans are predisposed to violence and 
dominance, but we overcame these limitations through the steady increase of our intellectual 
capabilities (see also Pinker, 2011). 
This picture radically changes, however, if a different ape species such as the bonobo, 
not the chimpanzee, turns out to be a comparatively better model of the social behavior of our 
last common ancestor. If the social world of our forebears was more cooperative and peaceful 
than depicted by the chimpanzee referential model, neither the killer ape hypothesis nor the 
demonic male view of our social nature would be completely right. I will argue in this paper, 
for instance, that, to a large extent, emotional and affective processes played a central role in 
the evolution of peaceful and cooperative human societies, rather than being solely a matter 
of emerging top-down control mechanisms. 
This hypothesis has consequences for ongoing philosophical debates. For example, 
recently there has been a lot of interest in the connection between morality, sexual selection, 
and cooperation (Joyce, 2006; Kitcher, 2011; Miller, 2007). But all these theories are built on 
the assumption that the social organization of early hominins closely resembled the social 
organization of the chimpanzee. If the sexual behavior of these hominins was less 
characterized by high levels of intermale and intersexual aggression than in chimpanzees, 
                                                 
2
 Top-down control is understood here as the processing of sensory and affective information that is driven by 
more cognitive processes such as goals or intentions. Bottom-up processing is the reverse of top-down 
processing, i.e., the processing of sensory and affective information that depends more directly on features of 
the stimulus input (for a more detailed discussion, see Rauss & Pourtois, 2013). 
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then the conditions for sexual selection would be radically different. Similarly, cooperation in 
a more socially tolerant ancestor would be different from the type of cooperation we find in 
highly hierarchical and aggressive primate social groups—the cognitive challenges are 
different and so are the mechanisms required to face them. 
I shall illustrate this point with Philip Kitcher’s (2011) hypothesis about the evolution 
of our capacity for normative guidance. According to Kitcher, the origins of the ethical 
project cannot be understood neither in terms of biological altruism nor in terms of behavioral 
altruism. The social life of our primate ancestors required a capacity for ‘psychological 
altruism’—roughly, a capacity to align one’s desires in response to the perceived desires of 
others, and not in expectation of some future benefit. In other words, Kitcher understands the 
emergence of human altruistic capacities as the gradual evolution of the cognitive and 
motivational psychological mechanisms underlying them (see also Sober & Wilson, 1998). 
This presupposes a form of belief-desire psychology, for “[…] altruists are intentional agents 
whose effective desires are other-directed.” (p. 20) In this view, psychological altruism 
fostered complex forms of cooperation, and vice versa, that ultimately led to the appearance 
of norms and the beginning of ethical practice. 
Yet psychological altruism in chimpanzees is limited in scope, as it was also in early 
hominins. To overcome these limitations, Kitcher argues, ancestral hominin groups 
developed quickly after the split with our sister lineage a capacity for normative guidance, 
i.e., a capacity to understand and respond to commands. He then offers a vindicating 
genealogy of this capacity since “[a]n ability to apprehend and obey commands changed the 
preferences and intentions of some ancestral hominids, leading them to act in greater 
harmony with their fellows and thus creating a more smoothly cooperative society”. (p. 74; 
see also Kitcher 2006, p. 172) Kitcher’s genealogy of our capacity for normative guidance is 
vindicating because it leads to ethical progress, beginning with its ancestral role in remedying 
failures of altruism in our chimpanzee-like hominin ancestors: 
 
Tens of thousands of years ago, our remote ancestors began the ethical project. 
They introduced socially embedded normative guidance in response to the 
tensions and difficulties of life together in small groups. They were equipped 
with dispositions to psychological altruism that enabled them to live together, 
but the limits of those dispositions prevented them from living together 
smoothly and easily. Out of their normative ventures have emerged some 
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precepts we are not likely ever to abandon, so long, at least, as we make 
ethical progress, the vague generalizations that embody ethical truths. (p. 409) 
 
On Kitcher’s view, the ethical project is a form of social technology that has played a 
central role in the gradual improvement of our hominin social life. This role is a vindicating 
one. Certainly, his strategy might seem unconventional since progress is usually explained in 
terms of truth. Instead, he thinks that his genealogy of moral cognition can make sense of 
ethical truth and ethical knowledge based on this notion of progress—the second part of his 
book is devoted to this issue. Progress is just functional efficiency. For moral practices have 
an original function, namely to remedy the failures of altruism that lead to social conflict. 
This is what Kitcher calls ‘pragmatic naturalism.’ As Kitcher put it: “Pragmatic naturalism 
retains a notion of ethical truth for expository purposes, but it starts from the concept of 
ethical progress.” (p. 210) 
As any other genealogical argument, Kitcher’s vindication of the ethical project is 
sensitive to issues about our hominin baseline. For his account of the role of normative 
guidance only makes sense in the context of a demonic male view. Male aggression is not a 
marginal feature of Kitcher’s analysis since he takes chimpanzees, rather than bonobos, as the 
model for our hominid past (p. 59, footnote 40) and chimpanzee societies are male-dominated 
societies. In his view, the evolution of normative guidance was initially grounded in fear of 
punishment, and the actual beginnings of the ethical project are seen as a transition from a 
state of limited psychological altruism to one in which commands are followed out of fear. 
This was so because the social life of our forebears was chimpanzee-like: 
 
Begin with chimpanzee societies in which a crude precursor of punishment is 
already present. Conflicts within these groups are often settled through the 
interventions of a dominant animal. Here rank or physical strength (or both as 
concomitants of each other) prevail, and a dispute is settled—not always, of 
course, through the infliction of pain or discomfort on the animal whose initial 
defection gave rise to the conflict. (p. 87) 
 
In these social groups, the capacity to understand and obey commands was favored by natural 
selection because it helped us to avoid the cost of being punished by the dominant. Thus, 
Kitcher’s view can be understood as a form of demonic male view. 
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Kitcher’s account of our capacity for normative guidance is important and 
enlightening. But his evolutionary account relies too heavily on a version of the so-called 
‘chimpanzee referential doctrine’ (Sayers, Raghanti, & Lovejoy, 2012), and a version of the 
demonic male view—the idea that dominance and male aggression were the cardinal 
challenges in the evolution of human sociality. His vindicating genealogy thus follows the 
typical narrative of this family of views in which high-level cognition plays the leading role 
in the expansion of the prosocial tendencies of our lineage. As we will see later, if the model 
of our early ancestors I will propose here is right, Kitcher’s account of the emergence of 
normative guidance would not be quite right. To the extent that his philosophical views (e.g., 
his vindication of the ethical project) rely on his evolutionary genealogy, they need to be 
reassessed in light of the plausibility of the different models of the social behavior of early 
hominins. 
 
2. The puzzle of hominin evolution 
 
Evolutionary explanations of cognition require a historical and a comparative context in order 
to determine the hominin baseline of social-cognitive capacities. This baseline can be 
established through research in comparative psychology. Most of the supporting evidence for 
the proposed model I will present here comes, in particular, from the comparative literature 
between chimpanzees and bonobos. Chimpanzees and bonobos are our closest living 
relatives. According to current estimates, the human lineage diverged from the Pan lineage 
about 6 to 4.5 mya (Prüfer et al., 2012), while chimpanzees and bonobos diverged from each 
other more recently, about 1-2 mya. As a result, chimpanzees and bonobos are very similar in 
many respects, but they are also significantly different in key social and sexual behaviors. 
The differences in social behavior are particularly intriguing. Chimpanzees show a 
clear linear dominance hierarchy among males, with male dominance over females (Goldberg 
& Wrangham, 1997). They also display relatively low levels of cooperation (Hirata & Fuwa, 
2007). In contrast, hierarchical relationships among bonobos are not always clearly defined 
(Kanō, 1992). Female dominance is common, and it is based on female alliances against 
aggressive males (Vervaecke, de Vries, & van Elsacker, 2000). Moreover, experimental 
evidence also suggests that bonobos are more similar to humans in the way they solve various 
cooperative problems (Hare, Melis, Woods, Hastings, & Wrangham, 2007). 
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Sexual and play behaviors are different as well. In bonobos, sexual interactions occur 
in mixed and same-sex pairings, and it is also used for conflict resolution (de Waal, 2001; de 
Waal & Lanting, 1997). Play behavior is common in adult bonobos, especially among 
females (Palagi, 2006). In contrast, chimpanzee sexual behavior is less rich and diverse 
(Goodall, 1986). Sexual interaction does not typically occur in same-sex pairings, and (as in 
other primates) high-ranking males monopolize estrus females. Unlike bonobos, play 
behavior is only frequent among chimpanzee infants, and no gender bias in terms of play 
behavior has been found so far. 
These behavioral differences are important because apes can be used as referential 
models, i.e., anatomical and behavioral proxies of our last common ancestor. In these models, 
the ethology, ecology, and cognitive skills of great apes are used to infer the traits that are 
most likely the ancestral condition of modern humans. These traits are either homologies 
(traits inherited from a common ancestor) or analogies (traits that have evolved independently 
due to similar selective pressures) or a combination of both. Moreover, although it is true that 
the recent split and stark differences between both species suggest that a wide range of social 
behaviors are quite plastic and evolutionarily labile, this could hardly be the whole 
explanation of these differences. As we will soon see, comparative studies in Pan show that 
neuroanatomical differences may be responsible for these behaviors, which indicates that 
these traits are not just a consequence of immediate differential responses to highly 
idiosyncratic socioecological factors.
3
 Thus, given the behavioral differences between 
chimpanzees and bonobos, it is reasonable to assume that our early hominin ancestors were in 
part a mosaic of traits seen in both Pan species.
4
 
This is a puzzle for hominin evolution since chimpanzees and bonobos constitute two 
very different models of our last common ancestor. The differences between these models 
                                                 
3
 Evolutionary lability can lead to these neuroanatomical differences. In plasticity-first hypotheses, phenotypic 
plasticity can produce developmental variants that might increase fitness (Levis & Pfennig, 2016). Selection can 
then refine the trait from an initial suboptimal version through genetic accommodation or even genetically 
assimilate the trait when environmental sensitivity is not favored (Moran, 1992; Waddington, 1953; West-
Eberhard, 2003). However, although the robust neuroanatomical differences between chimpanzees and bonobos 
might be the result of some form of genetic accommodation or assimilation, they cannot be explained merely as 
an immediate response to environmental change or stress. 
4
 Of course, this does not rule out the possibility that early hominins and the Pan/Homo LCA would have been 
in some respects very different from both Pan species. Fossil evidence in Ar. ramidus, for instance, indicates 
that the Pan/Homo LCA could have possessed anatomical adaptations for bipedalism and omnivory. This 
evidence will be discussed in more detail in section 5. 
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have important consequences—e.g., the demonic male hypothesis is only plausible if the last 
common ancestor was more chimpanzee-like than bonobo-like. In the next sections of this 
paper, I will argue that our best model of the social behavior of early hominins is not only 
one that carries features of chimpanzees, bonobos, and probably other species, but also one 
that stresses the comparative similarities between bonobos and those early ancestors. This 
‘mosaic model’, I claim, has important consequences for our understanding of the 
evolutionary trajectory of our distinctive prosocial tendencies. 
 
3. The mosaic hypothesis 
 
On the view I want to defend here, early hominins were a mosaic of different traits seen not 
only in chimpanzees but also in other primate species. So, the key problem is to determine 
which particular aspects should be included in the mosaic on the basis of the available 
evidence. I will focus, in particular, on a version of this hypothesis, i.e., the idea that bonobos 
are to some degree a constitutive part of that mosaic. Of course, my concern here is not 
whether bonobos are closer to us than chimpanzees. Nor is it which species better resembles, 
say, the Pan/Homo LCA. My claim is a comparative one, namely that bonobos are in some 
important respects a more suitable model of the social behavior of early hominins and the 
Pan/Homo LCA with respect to our equally distant relative, the chimpanzee. 
The overall picture of this comparative model is one in which early hominin ancestors 
were characterized by a level of social tolerance and prosocial skills that went beyond the 
usual chimpanzee referential model. This is not a minor issue. For increased social tolerance 
and enhanced prosocial skills diminish the role of aggression and dominance in the evolution 
of our lineage. They make aggression and dominance less restrictive constraints on the 
evolutionary trajectory of the lineage when the selective pressures for increased cooperation 
escalated. Adaptations for tolerance and prosociality make the evolutionary trajectory toward 
seemingly distinctive human traits such as imitative learning  (Galef, 1996, 2009; Tomasello, 
2009) or collective foraging (Tomasello, Melis, Tennie, Wyman, & Herrmann, 2012) more 
accessible. 
The feasibility of the mosaic hypothesis and the version of this model I propose here 
are supported in the first place by genetic evidence. Recently, Prüfer and colleagues (2012) 
have completed the sequencing of the bonobo genome and have compared it to the already 
sequenced genome of chimpanzees and humans. They showed that about 1.6% of the human 
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genome is more closely related to (i.e., more similar to homologues in) bonobos than 
chimpanzees while 1.7% of the human genome is more closely related to the chimpanzee 
than to the bonobo genome (Prüfer et al., 2012, pp. 2-3). Given the behavioral differences 
between chimpanzees and bonobos, they argue that, at least in principle, the last common 
ancestor of these three species could have possessed traits seen in both Pan species (2012, p. 
527). 
This genetic evidence not only gives prima facie motivation for the idea that the 
Pan/Homo LCA had some bonobo-like traits. It also suggests that bonobos can be useful 
referential models. The value of bonobos as models of early hominins is likely not only 
limited to common ancestry, though. It is also plausible that many features we see in this 
extant species resemble those we see in human because both species underwent similar 
selective regimes (see section 6 in this paper for discussion). Either way, I would like to 
argue that it is quite possible that our early hominin ancestors, and even perhaps the 
Pan/Homo LCA, were characterized by: 
 
(i) group hunting behavior, 
(ii) enhanced emotional control, 
(iii) increased aversion against aggression (specially intermale and intergroup 
aggression), 
(iv) enhanced brain connectivity for empathy (top-down and bottom-up control of 
aggressive impulses), 
(v) increased mind reading skills, 
(vi) increased cooperative and sharing tendencies, 
(vii) non-linear/ill-defined hierarchy, 
(viii) and non-exclusive male dominance. 
 
Traits (ii)-(vi) are comparative features, i.e., they are traits of early hominins that are well 
above the hypothesized levels of a chimpanzee-like model of that ancestor. According to 
these features, the social life of our early ancestors was in these respects more bonobo-like 
than chimpanzee-like. This does not rule out, of course, that other species could be in 
principle a better model for these features. But for the purpose of the present argument, these 
comparative claims suffice. For the evolutionary trajectory would be less constrained by our 
aggressive and dominant tendencies, such that overcoming them would be displaced (so to 
speak) from the center of gravity of our evolutionary narrative. In other words, if the present 
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model is on the right track, there would be sufficient reasons to be skeptical about the killer 
ape hypothesis or the demonic male view of the social-cognitive capacities of our early 
hominin ancestors. 
Moreover, from a philosophical point of view, this model would lead us to reassess 
naturalistic arguments based on these assumptions, such as Kitcher’s evolutionary narrative 
of the emergence of our capacity for normative guidance. For the above model would be 
linked to a different picture of the trajectory of hominin social evolution and the timing of the 
appearance of more complex forms of social cognition. As I will argue later, the fossil record 
supports the view that very early in our lineage, hominins were less aggressive and more 
tolerant than commonly assumed by chimpanzee referential models. 
 
4. Evidence for the model 
 
The features of the proposed model are closely linked to social behavior. In behavioral 
phylogenetics, it is possible to reconstruct an ancestor’s behaviors if such behaviors are 
present in all of its living descendants. This argument relies on considerations of parsimony. 
To the extent that parsimony is a guide, group hunting would be characteristic of our last 
common ancestor. For recent evidence shows that this behavior is also present in the bonobo 
(Surbeck & Hohmann, 2008). The same goes for some aspects of physical cognition such as 
tool manufacture and use (Gruber, Clay, & Zuberbühler, 2010; Ingmanson, 1996). 
Since humans also possess those behavioral traits, it is possible to infer that the 
Pan/Homo LCA did (i) hunt in groups. It is true that, given that traits such as tool 
manufacture and use are present in all great apes and also in other primate species, their 
presence in early hominins is a somewhat more conservative phylogenetic inference than 
group hunting. The set of data points is significantly smaller in that case. Nonetheless, there 
is evidence that by 3.4 mya hominins were using stone tools to hunt large mammals 
(McPherron et al., 2010), which pushes the plausibility of ape-like hunting much deeper in 
the hominin lineage. Therefore, it is just as likely, if not more likely, that group hunting was 
present in the Pan/Homo LCA as assuming that it emerged very early in our lineage and then 
independently in Pan. 
In addition, the neural circuitry that mediates anxiety, empathy, and the inhibition of 
aggression in humans is better developed in bonobos than in chimpanzees. Bonobos and 
humans have a similar organization in the orbitofrontal cortex and a relatively smaller area 13 
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(Semendeferi, Armstrong, Schleicher, Zilles, & Van Hoesen, 1998). Differences in the 
organization and size of these parts of the brain influence emotional reactions and social 
behavior, e.g., area 13 is known to be associated with changes in emotional states and 
disinhibition of emotional reactions. 
Bonobos and humans also possess a similar distribution of von Economo (VEN) 
neurons in the anterior cingulate and frontoinsular cortex (Nimchinsky et al., 1999). In 
humans, their hypothesized functions include self- and social awareness, self-control, and 
empathy (Allman et al., 2010, 2011), which would be crucial for bonobo social organization 
and its typically weak dominance hierarchy. They are also thought to be an important part of 
the circuitry responsible for rapid intuitive choice in complex social situations (Allman, 
Watson, Tetreault, & Hakeem, 2005).
5
 
Similarly, recent comparative studies have shown that two pathways, one connecting 
the amygdala and the anterior cingulate cortex, and another connecting the amygdala and the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, are larger in bonobos than chimpanzees (Rilling et al., 2011). 
The former is implicated in emotion regulation in humans while the latter enables the 
restraint of aggression via top-down suppression of aggressive impulses from the amygdala 
(Davidson, Putnam, & Larson, 2000; Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2006; Pezawas et al., 2005). 
The same pathway may also be involved in controlling aggressive impulses through a 
bottom-up relay of perceived distress in others to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex that 
inhibits anti-social behavior (Blair, 2007, 2008). 
Insofar as the above neurobiological traits are examples of fine-grained similarities, 
then parsimony suggests that the early hominins possessed (ii) enhanced emotional control, 
(iii) increased aversion against aggression, and (iv) enhanced brain connectivity for empathy 
with respect to a hypothetical chimpanzee-like model of these ancestors. A broader look at 
the neurobiology of other empathic and tolerant primate species gives some additional 
support to this view. For callitrichid monkeys, for instance, are quite socially tolerant but 
their social behavior relies on somewhat different neural circuitry. They possess small brains 
and their empathic behavior is mediated by physiological responses that are especially geared 
                                                 
5
 As pointed out by one of the reviewers of this paper, the importance of VEN neurons can be understood more 
fully along with the hypothesis that developmental and degenerative diseases such as autism (Allman et al., 
2005; Santos et al., 2011), frontotemporal dementia (Santillo et al., 2014; Seeley et al., 2006), and schizophrenia 
(Brüne et al., 2010) may be connected with its recent evolutionary history. Since all these disorders affect the 
social brain, these findings seem to support the idea that these neurons have acquired a specific role in mammals 
living in large and complex social groups (Cauda, Geminiani, & Vercelli, 2014). 
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to cooperative breeding (Fernandez-Duque, Valeggia, & Mendoza, 2009). This indicates that 
empathy and emotion regulation are not necessarily related to an increase in gray and white 
matter connectivity as in bonobos and humans, which makes a hypothesis about convergent 
evolution less likely. 
Bonobos are also more socially tolerant than chimpanzees, especially when co-
feeding (Hare et al., 2007). They show a stronger stress hormone response to feeding 
competition (Wobber et al., 2010). They have also been described as more nervous and shy 
than chimpanzees (de Waal & Lanting, 1997). As in humans, these differences in 
temperament are associated with enhanced social-cognitive skills. Studies with young 
children, for instance, show a strong connection between shyness and mindreading skills 
(Wellman, Lane, LaBounty, & Olson, 2011). Similarly, bonobos outperform chimpanzees in 
tasks related to mindreading, while chimpanzees are more skilled at tasks requiring the use of 
tools and an understanding of physical causality (Herrmann, Hare, Call, & Tomasello, 2010). 
Differences in mindreading skills, however, cannot be explained solely on the basis of 
social tolerance. These differences are products of a particular neural system for 
understanding the intentional states of others. The medial prefrontal cortex and the 
temporoparietal junction are known to be implicated in mindreading capabilities in humans 
(Gallagher & Frith, 2003; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). Thus, the fact that bonobos also have 
increased gray matter in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex compared with chimpanzees seems 
to be telling. Mindreading skills in apes are typically linked to competitive contexts (Call & 
Tomasello, 2008), but there is no reason to think that food and mating competition is stronger 
in bonobos than chimpanzees. Thus, explaining this increased capacity in bonobos through a 
convergent selective gradient seems problematic. 
Levels of tolerance also affect sharing behavior in Pan. Chimpanzees share food with 
conspecifics only under some circumstances—e.g., food transfer from mother to offspring 
(Ueno & Matsuzawa, 2004) or when the food is not valuable and not monopolizable 
(Blurton-Jones, 1987; Gilby, 2006). However, peaceful food sharing in wild bonobos seems 
to contradict the usual sharing-under-pressure hypothesis (Yamamoto, 2015). Under 
experimental conditions, active and voluntary food sharing also seems to be present in 
bonobos (Hare & Kwetuenda, 2010), even among strangers and when food is easily 
monopolizable (Tan & Hare, 2013). 
Moreover, recent studies suggest that selection on emotional reactivity critically 
shapes a species’ ability to solve social problems (Hare et al., 2005; Hare & Tomasello, 
2005). This hypothesis, for instance, predicts that bonobos will cooperate more successfully 
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in food-retrieval tasks than chimpanzees because tolerance levels are higher in bonobos. So, 
although experimentally both species have been shown to be equally successful at 
cooperating when food is difficult to monopolize, tests with monopolizable food have shown 
that bonobos are much more prone to cooperation than chimpanzees (Hare et al., 2007). 
Given the differences in temperament between chimpanzees and bonobos, it is at least 
as plausible that early hominins possessed (v) increased mindreading skills and (vi) increased 
cooperative and sharing tendencies with respect to a hypothetical chimpanzee-like model of 
the Pan/Homo LCA as it is to adopt the standard chimpanzee referential model. This is a non-
negligible difference in social-cognitive abilities. The fact that these differences are 
correlated with particular neurobiological similarities between bonobos and humans also 
deserves attention. The chimpanzee’s mindreading and cooperative capacities cannot simply 
be taken to represent the ones of early hominins. 
Naturally, sexual behavior in all the three species has important differences. But a 
crucial similarity between bonobos and humans is that both species use sexual behavior in a 
social context. Unlike chimpanzees, female bonobos are continuously sexually active and 
attractive. So, in bonobos and humans, sexual intercourse can be initiated at any point, which 
in turn increases bonding between individuals. Bonobos with lower testosterone levels and 
attenuated testosterone responses engage more often in amicable relationships with unrelated 
females and have greater reproductive success (Surbeck, Deschner, Schubert, Weltring, & 
Hohmann, 2012). Therefore, bonobo males benefit from affiliative long-term association with 
females (Surbeck et al., 2012), which facilitates more egalitarian and more peaceful social 
lives. 
Similarly, hypothalamus size and amygdala size have been shown to predict social 
play frequency in non-human primates but not nonsocial play (Lewis & Barton, 2006). 
Bonobos—females more than males—seem to use play to assess physical skills, the 
willingness of other individuals to invest in a relationship, and to strengthen already existing 
social bonds. Adult bonobos play much more frequently than chimpanzees. This asymmetry 
is important because it has been experimentally shown that both species use grooming and 
play as social currency (Schroepfer-Walker, Wobber, & Hare, 2015). Play is a valuable social 
interaction and can be used to establish social preferences depending on the amount of 
playful interactions between individuals. Thus, play behavior could also have a crucial role in 
the bonobo social organization and its typically weak dominance hierarchy. 
To the extent that the above neurobiological similarities are correlated with the more 
egalitarian social structure of bonobos, they would suggest that early hominins lived in (vii) 
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less hierarchical and arguably (viii) less male-dominated social groups with respect to a 
hypothetical chimpanzee-like model of the Pan/Homo LCA. Explanations of the evolution of 
the bonobo usually argue that reduced male aggression toward females was sexually selected 
(Wrangham & Peterson, 1996). But it is at least equally likely that this trait was inherited 
from the common ancestor, especially in light of the fact that the traditional evolutionary 
scenario for the split between chimpanzees and bonobos is not supported by our current 




Granted, this is not conclusive evidence for the mosaic hypothesis or the particular 
model I have offered in the previous section. However, even if the case for the model is not 
compelling enough, we have good reasons to think that the social behavior of early hominins, 
including the Pan/Homo LCA, was in many respects not chimpanzee-like. The chimpanzee 
referential model could not be anymore the default assumption. 
 
5. Paleoanthropological support 
 
Although certainly thin, the above evidence suggests that the Pan/Homo LCA was in some 
respects more bonobo-like than chimpanzee-like. In this section, I will argue that even if the 
Pan/Homo LCA was not characterized by the features ascribed in the model, we still have 
reasons to think that they evolved very early in our lineage. For the paleoanthropological 
evidence suggests that early hominins were much more socially tolerant than the chimpanzee 
referential doctrine actually tells us (Sayers et al., 2012). 
Fossil evidence is central to whatever model of our hominin ancestry we choose. 
Referential models are constrained by phylogenetic inferences—after all, phylogenetic 
analysis can be understood as a form of referential modeling (Duda & Zrzavý, 2013). But 
fossil evidence particularly restricts the scope and shape of these models. Generally speaking, 
referential models are either based on homology through shared descent (McGrew, 1981) or 
                                                 
6
 According to this hypothesis, the formation of the Congo River isolated an ancestral population of the common 
ancestor of chimpanzees and bonobos around 2 mya (Wrangham & Peterson, 1996; Wrangham, 1993). This 
population did not have to compete with gorillas for resources, which allowed females to form coalitions and 
resist the advances of males. Since coercion was not an efficient mating strategy, sexual selection favored less 
aggressive males. This led to the evolution of bonobos and their distinctively low levels of aggression. However, 
the current geological evidence contradicts this scenario because it indicates that the present Congo River was 
formed much earlier, around 34 mya. 
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analogy through convergent evolution (DeVore & Washburn, 1963; Fernandes, 1991; Jolly, 
2001; Perry et al., 2003). The above model can be considered rather neutral regarding this 
issue. 
Paleoanthropological evidence, however, suggests that even if some aspects of the 
proposed model are not homologies, i.e., ancestral traits of the Pan/Homo LCA that have 
been retained by bonobos and humans, they might have evolved early in our lineage. This 
view is supported by fossil evidence from Sahelanthropus, Orrorin, and Ardipithecus, which 
indicates that our lineage was less aggressive and less male-dominated than assumed by the 
traditional chimpanzee referential model (Brunet et al., 2002; Haile-Selassie, Suwa, & White, 
2004; Pickford & Senut, 2001; White et al., 2009). 
Early hominins and the Pan/Homo LCA could also have been very different from 
both Pan species. Fossil evidence from Ar. ramidus, for instance, indicates that this early 
hominin was well-adapted to bipedality, although it retained arboreal capabilities (Lovejoy, 
Latimer, Suwa, Asfaw, & White, 2009). This means a more human-like locomotion system, 
quite different from that seen in any extant ape. Another important difference is that Ar. 
ramidus appears to be neither a ripe fruit specialist like Pan, nor a folivorous browser like 
Gorilla, but rather a more generalized omnivore (Suwa et al., 2009). However, the same 
fossil evidence also suggests that the social behavior of the Pan/Homo LCA was in many 
important respects more bonobo-like than chimpanzee-like and that this social behavior is 
likely to be an ancestral condition. 
Evidence from Ardipithecus ramidus is particularly telling. The fossil record of this 
ancestor is rich and the completeness of some remains makes sex assessment relatively 
reliable (White, Lovejoy, Asfaw, Carlson, & Suwa, 2015; White, Suwa, & Asfaw, 1994). 
Dating estimates place this hominin at circa 4.4 mya, very close to the split between these 
two lineages, which makes this ancestor highly relevant for reconstructing the morphology 
and behavior of the Pan/Homo LCA. 
Ar. ramidus remains reveal that this hominin was characterized by reduced canine 
teeth and low body size dimorphism. In basal dimensions, the canines of Ar. ramidus are 
approximately as large as those of female chimpanzees and male bonobos, although their 
crown heights are shorter; they are comparable to those of Australopithecus anamensis and 
Australopithecus afarensis (Suwa et al., 2009). They are also ‘feminized’ in shape. The size 
of the upper canine tooth is not only similar to that of females, but also less sharp than those 
of chimpanzees. 
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Reduced canine teeth dimorphism is a common feature of the hominin clade. Along 
with Ar. ramidus, this trait is seen in Sahelanthropus (Brunet et al., 2002, p. 150), Orrorin 
(Senut et al., 2001), and Ar. kadabba (Haile-Selassie, 2001). Since the canine tooth is usually 
used as a weapon in intermale and intergroup conflicts, the less pronounced upper canine 
teeth suggests that early hominins, including Ar. ramidus, were characterized by relatively 
little intermale and intergroup aggression compared to chimpanzees. 
Similarly, Ar. ramidus is also expected to have shown little sexual dimorphism in 
body size—comparable to that of chimpanzees or humans, as opposed to orangutans or 
gorillas (White et al., 2009). In higher primates, body size dimorphism is usually coupled 
with strong canine dimorphism. Using dimorphism to infer behavior in early hominids is 
usually problematic because their unique combination of minimal canine size dimorphism 
and intense body mass dimorphism (Plavcan & van Schaik, 1997). But this is not the case in 
Ar. Ramidus. As a consequence, lack of sexual dimorphism seems to indicate that males did 
not compete against each other for dominance. 
While intermale and intergroup aggression are frequent among chimpanzees, Ar. 
ramidus possessed low levels of agonistic male-male competition (Clark & Henneberg, 
2015)—and even, perhaps, male-female codominance as in bonobos (Suwa et al., 2009, p. 
57). We cannot be sure about these aspects of the social behavior of our early ancestors, but 
we can infer them indirectly. For early hominins do not seem to have any of the adaptations 
for agonistic male-male competition present in other living primates. In turn, reduced male 
sexual dimorphism does not seem to have an obvious survival advantage. Yet this trait could 
have led to a reproductive advantage through sexual selection—e.g., because bipedalism 
facilitated provisioning, which would have been a more efficient mating strategy (Lovejoy, 
2009). 
Parallel evolution does not always seem to give us the most parsimonious 
reconstruction of these traits. Chimpanzees are more sexually dimorphic than bonobos and 
humans, and australopithecines were more sexually dimorphic than both extant Pan species 
(Gordon, Green, & Richmond, 2008; Van Arsdale & Wolpoff, 2013)—which is true in terms 
of body size but not canine size (Leutenegger & Shell, 1987; McHenry, 1992; Plavcan & van 
Schaik, 1992). Therefore, to the extent that australopithecines are direct ancestors of modern 
humans (and not a paraphyletic sister lineage, which they may be), this loss of sexual 
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Another option would be to suggest that low sexual dimorphism is, in fact, the 
ancestral condition, with a pattern of increasing dimorphism in australopithecines and 
chimpanzees. Australopithecines would be a paraphyletic sister lineage (an alternative 
pointed out to me by Kim Shaw-Williams, personal communication), or not as sexually 
dimorphic as it has often been claimed (Reno, McCollum, Meindl, & Lovejoy, 2010; Reno, 
Meindl, McCollum, & Lovejoy, 2003). In this way, the evolutionary trajectory of the human 
lineage could be explained without postulating so many evolutionary reversals, or by 
invoking less drastic shifts. However, this would challenge the current picture of 
Australopithecus as a very aggressive, highly sexually dimorphic genus, or even its place as 
direct human ancestor—a hypothesis that, nonetheless, would be worth exploring (see figure 
1). 
 
                                                 
7
 A similar problem occurs with diet. Ar. ramidus and modern humans are omnivorous, but australopithecines 
were largely frugivorous, similar to extant Pan. They lack the particular dental adaptations that are characteristic 
of omnivores. This means that these adaptations would have disappeared in australopithecines to reappear later 
in the human lineage and then disappear again in Pan. 
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Figure 1. Diagram of two evolutionary arrangements of five hominid species. According to 
one view (solid line), Ar. ramidus and A. afarensis are direct ancestors of humans (H. 
sapiens). But Ar. ramidus, bonobos (P. paniscus), and humans are characterized by low sexual 
dimorphism and low levels of intermale and intergroup aggression while A. afarensis and 
chimpanzees (P. troglodytes) show increased levels of sexual dimorphism and aggression. On 
top of that, Ar. ramidus and humans are characterized by an omnivorous diet and a similar 
dentition, although A. afarensis and Pan have specialized masticatory apparatus. A more 
parsimonious reconstruction (dashed line) would be then to consider A. afarensis not as the 
direct ancestors of modern humans, but rather as part of a paraphyletic sister lineage. 
 
It is not clear whether body size dimorphism in australopithecines is a consequence of 
male-male competition since their canines have a variety of features inconsistent with their 
use as a weapon (Greenfield, 1992). There are multiple reasons that could potentially explain 
the increase in body size dimorphism in australopithecines, e.g., reduction in female body 
size (Leigh & Shea, 1995), predator defense (Clutton-Brock, Harvey, & Rudder, 1977), or the 
Rench’s rule (see Fairbairn, 1997). 
Although there is no necessary link between the specific features ascribed by the 
model and the paleoanthropological evidence, the common theme of reduced (or controlled) 
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aggression in early hominins stands. Even if the Pan/Homo LCA was very different from the 
proposed model, a decrease in these aggressive tendencies seems to have occurred very early 
in our lineage. Notably, for instance, increased levels of social tolerance have been associated 
with early heterochronic changes in craniofacial growth. So, it might well be the case that in 
Ar. ramidus the energetic demands of craniofacial growth were redirected to provisioning 
(Clark & Henneberg, 2015). 
 
6. Philosophical consequences 
 
The model I have defended in this paper has important philosophical consequences for 
descriptive theories of ethics. For it gives us a different picture of the evolution and nature of 
our capacity for normative guidance (Kitcher, 1998, 2006, 2011), i.e., our capacity to grasp 
norms and to make normative judgments. 
In section 1, I suggested that Kitcher’s account of the emergence of the capacity for 
normative guidance is a particular form of the demonic male view. Similar to this view, 
Kitcher’s evolutionary scenario relies on a chimpanzee-like social environment where 
dominance and aggression are the key driving forces behind human evolution. On Kitcher’s 
account, dominant alpha males punish anyone who disrupts the established social order, and 
this makes normative guidance, at least initially, psychologically grounded in fear. In 
addition, as in the demonic male view, the evolution of our capacity for normative guidance 
is in part the story of the gradual expansion of top-down mechanisms of control (in the form 
of some sensitivity to commands) over our less reliable emotional nature. If an agent is able 
to understand the normative structure of its chimpanzee-like social environment, that agent 
will be able to avoid the costs imposed by aggressive alpha males. The motivational force to 
obey these commands comes for free in this case since they help the agent to avoid situations 
in which the anticipated consequences are feared or disliked. 
The above model, then, bears important consequences for Kitcher’s view of 
normative guidance and its function. For, according to him, normative guidance has to be 
more explicit, more a matter of offline cognition. But the model of early hominins I presented 
in section 3 strongly suggests that neither the demonic male view nor Kitcher’s (2011) 
account of our capacity for normative guidance are plausible. On this model, the social world 
of our last common ancestor is not male-dominated (viii), their social organization is less 
hierarchical (vii) and social cohesion is less regulated by aggression and fear of punishment 
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(vi). On the contrary, this ancestor is characterized by its enhanced emotional control (ii), 
increased aversion against aggression (iii), empathy and positive emotions (iv), and enhanced 
perspective taking capacities (v). If this is correct, normative guidance would not have been 
selected for avoiding punishment by very aggressive and authoritative alpha males. Kitcher’s 
vindicating genealogy becomes murky. The tendencies of some individuals to monopolize 
resources and to impose social order through aggression would have been largely regulated in 
our lineage through more bottom-up affective processes. No sensitivity to commands is 
required. No norms are invoked. Another explanation would be necessary. 
Kitcher’s evolutionary account of normative guidance is not the only available 
explanation. It is also not the best. I think a better explanation of the shift toward normative 
guidance could be framed in terms of shared intentionality (Tomasello & Carpenter, 2007). 
Shared intentionality seems to account for much of the distinctive features of human 
psychology. It has been argued, for instance, that such capacity is responsible for the 
appearance of joint attention, cooperative communication, imitative learning, and teaching, 
which are at the basis of cultural learning and the social norms and traditions we see in 
human culture (Tomasello, 2014). Although joint activities and behavioral traditions are 
common among great apes, humans substantially differ from other apes in their underlying 
psychological mechanisms. Chimpanzees and bonobos can attribute some psychological 
states such as perceptions and goals to others (Tomasello, Call, & Hare, 2003), but they are 
neither intrinsically motivated to share those psychological states nor are able to represent 
these mental states in a joint, collective fashion (Call, 2009). 
Primates do form social expectations but they lack the capacity to form normative 
ones (von Rohr, Burkart, & van Schaik, 2011). Normative expectations depend for their 
emergence and maintenance on shared acceptance and commitment. Joint goals, for instance, 
are normatively binding mental states of the form “We intend to do x”. If someone 
unexpectedly abandons the joint activities that these states bring about, other group members 
may demand an explanation and censure that partner (Warneken, Chen, & Tomasello, 2006; 
Warneken, Gräfenhain, & Tomasello, 2012; Warneken, Hare, Melis, Hanus, & Tomasello, 
2007). Thus, abandoning the joint activity naturally entails a risk of reprisal (Gilbert, 1989). 
Similarly, it has been argued that shared intentionality also has straightforward consequences 
for moral cognition (Tomasello, 2015) since, as Christine Korsgaard has nicely put it: “The 
primal scene of morality […] is not one in which I do something to you or you do something 
to me, but one in which we do something together” (1993, p. 25). 
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Given that much of the empirical work on this psychological phenomenon comes 
from the comparative literature, the theory on shared intentionality offers a helpful 
framework to put normative guidance within an evolutionary context. This capacity, for 
instance, is thought to be closely linked to the selective pressures resulting from cooperative 
activities such as cooperative breeding and collaborative foraging. The former is often 
considered a previous step for the full emergence of shared intentionality (Hawkes, 2012, 
2014) because, although cooperative breeding leads to greater prosocial skills, it does not 
entail in itself higher cognition (Burkart et al., 2014). For this reason, it has been argued that 
the selective pressures of collaborative foraging, which are more cognitively demanding in 
terms of coordination, would explain the emergence of the type of complex cognition 
underlying shared intentionality, starting with Homo erectus and continuing with Homo 
heidelbergensis (Tomasello et al., 2012). 
Since it is only with the emergence of collaborative foraging that we can fully explain 
the emergence of shared intentionality, it would be only until then that we could expect social 
norms to emerge—i.e., understanding them as mutually known expectations bearing social 
force and enforced by third parties. The fact that the increase in the gradient of human 
cooperation would be partially explained by the role of normative thinking in facilitating 
coordination would explain why some (Sterelny, 2012; Sterelny & Fraser, unpublished) only 
see a partial or incomplete vindication in this type of genealogies since many norms could 
have evolved to fix coordination problems in situations where multiple equilibria are 
possible.  
In sum, one idea for further exploration would be to think of our capacity for 
normative guidance as having been selected for to avoid disappointing a relationship 
partner’s expectations in a more tolerant social environment when hominins became more 
interdependent foragers (Tomasello et al., 2012). Norms would be conceived as shared 
expectations about how individuals ought to behave in a given situation, i.e., they would be 
represented as joint intentional states. These expectations were necessary to carry out tasks 
that required complex coordination such as collaborative foraging and more so to build the 
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